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INTRODUCTION

In a year when there was nationwide impetus for a move to
some form of no fault automobile insurance,' the South Carolina
legislature adopted the Automobile Insurance Reform Act,2 a

product of two years of study and consideration. 3 The 1974 session
of the South Carolina General Assembly not only adopted a modified form of no fault but also incorporated within the Act substantial modifications of existing state automobile liability laws, including the substitution of a reinsurance facility4 for the assigned
risk plan. Moreover, this legislation purports to abolish two trou1. The impetus comes in part from the pending National No-Fault Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act, S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), more commonly referred to as the HartMagnuson bill. Indeed, the first recital in the concurrent resolution establishing the committee that drafted the South Carolina statute stated: "Whereas, a proposal to establish
nationwide no-fault automobile insurance is presently under consideration by the United
States Congress . . . ." Concurrent Resolution S-674, 99th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d
Sess. (1972). See text accompanying notes 100-04 infra for a discussion of the national
proposal and an inquiry into whether the South Carolina Act meets its requirements.
2. No. 1177, [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2718. The Act itself provides that Articles I
through IV of Section 1 (which include, primarily, the no fault and mandatory insurance
coverage provisions) are to be entitled the "South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act of 1974." Inasmuch as this note deals not only with the "Reparation Reform Act"
but also with other selected provisions of the statute, the Act in its entirety is herein
referred to as the "Insurance Reform Act."
3. In 1972, a concurrent resolution of the General Assembly created a committee of
nine members chaired by Senator Ralph Gasque to prepare a study of automobile insurance plans, including the no fault automobile insurance system. Concurrent Resolution
S-674, 99th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1972). The Committee's instructions were
to recommend a program of automobile insurance reform to the 1973 General Assembly.
In early 1973, the Committee concluded that
the problem with automobile insurance in South Carolina wasn't simply the
problem of the Assigned Risk Plan or even whether or not to adopt no-fault
insurance. There were also problems of the complete availability of automobile
insurance to the South Carolina motorist; the problem of the uninsured motorist
and the habitual offender; the problem of automobile insurance premium rates.
Every issue was like a tentacle growing out from a key issue-automobile insurance.
COMMIrEE TO MAKE A STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS INCLUD-

ING THE NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE SYSTEM, 99TH GEN. ASSEMBLY OF S.C., 2D SEAss., SECOND

REPORT (Comm. Print 1974). Faced with a multifaceted problem, the committee conducted extensive meetings and hearings and hammered out what it felt to be a workable
solution. This bill, along with four other bills on the subject of no fault insurance, was
introduced late in the 1973 session but failed to gain passage. During the 1974 session,
the Senate and House passed modified versions of the Gasque Committee's bill. A conference committee spent a great part of the legislative session attempting to reconcile differences in the two versions of the bill. After giving the conference committee free conference
powers, the House finally adopted the committee report on June 29. The Senate followed
on July 2.
4. Insurance Reform Act § 3, art. V.
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blesome doctrines of tort law insofar as they apply to automobile
accident litigation: the common law doctrines of contributory
negligence 5 and intra-family tort immunity.'
As might be expected in a legislative product of this magnitude and scope, the Act contains areas of imprecise and ambiguous language that will require judicial interpretation and legislative amendment. Whether such language is the product of the
inevitable compromise necessary to secure passage of such a controversial bill7 or of oversight on the part of the drafters is, of
course, open to debate.
This note specifically analyzes two potentially troublesome
areas of the Automobile Insurance Reform Act-no fault, and the
abolition of contributory negligence.8 It is hoped that this analysis
will be of value to the judiciary and the legislature in their subsequent efforts to develop a consistent and intelligible automobile
reparations system.
1I.

A.

SOUTH CAROLINA AUTOMOBILE REPARATION REFORM

ACT

First Party Coverage, Setoff, and Related Provisions
1. Development of the No Fault Concept

The most controversial, if not the most important, section of
the Act is its atypical "no fault" provision. As one commentator
has said, "Few legal concepts have generated such passionate
controversy as that embodied in the phrase 'no fault automobile
insurance.'" Basically, "no fault insurance" involves a type of
"first party" coverage'" whereby an insurance company agrees to
5. Id. § 4C. See text accompanying notes 155-206 infra.
6. Id. § 4B.
7. Throughout its two year history, the Act was altered in numerous respects and the
final result is the product of much legislative compromise. For example, when the Senate
version of the Gasque Committee bill was sent to the House for consideration, it was
subjected to 97 amendments from the floor, a record figure according to the Clerk of the
House. The State, April 3, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 4.
8. Several other fundamental aspects of the Act, e.g., the rate structure, the reinsurance facility, and intra-family tort immunity, will be analyzed in a subsequent issue of
the South CarolinaLaw Review.
9. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTOISTS 183 (1972) [hereinafter cited as P. PRETZEL].
10. The term "first party coverage" is derived from the fact that the person who
purchases the insurance is referred to as the "first party," the company that issues the
policy is the "second party," while strangers to the contract are "third parties." Under a
no fault scheme payment is made directly from the second party to the first party, hence,
"first party coverage." By this analysis the existing system of liability insurance is then
"third party coverage." This term is prevalent in England and Australia, whereas the
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compensate its own insured directly, regardless of whether he
was at fault, for certain economic losses arising out of automobile
accidents." Depending on the particular plan adopted, the common law right of tort recovery from the driver of the other vehicle
may be fully or partially abrogated.
The history of the no fault concept, as well as the advantages
and shortcomings of the multifarious no fault proposals, is well
documented.12 The idea itself of no fault insurance originated in
a 1932 study conducted by the Columbia University Council for
Research in Social Studies. 3 Except for an experiment with a
similar plan in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan in 1946, 14
the idea inspired only academic interest until the mid-1960's,
when Professors Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell developed
a comprehensive plan for restructuring the existing system of
automobile liability insurance. Professors Keeton and O'Connell,
as well as other no fault advocates, point to many evils in the
existing tort liability system. Among the weaknesses of the curphrase "liability insurance" is used more often in the United States. R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRFnC VIrnM 588 (1965) [hereinafter cited as R.
KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL].

11. Actually a large majority of today's insurance agreements are "no fault" plans in
the sense that fault on the part of the insured does not preclude him from recovering from
his own insurance carrier. Life insurance benefits are payable regardless of who was at
fault in bringing about the death of the deceased, and fire insurance policies provide
coverage for loss by fire without regard to fault. Indeed, many of the coverages of an
automobile policy are "no fault" in the broad sense of the term. For example, collision,
medical payments, and comprehensive coverages are all offered on an optional basis and
do not concern themselves with the fault of the insured. Over the years, however, the term
"no fault" has become associated exclusively with automobile reparations systems of the
"Keeton-O'Connell" variety. The Keeton-O'Connell proposal is discussed in the text accompanying notes 15-24 infra.
12. See, e.g., DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT, RESPONSIBLE REFORm-A
PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE LIABILITY REPARATIONS SYSTEM (1969); DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPORT, AUToMoBILE PERSoNAL INJURY CLAIMS (1970); I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE (1974); N.Y. INS. DEP'T, REPORT, AUToMoBILE INSURANCE. . . FOR
WHOSE BENEFIT? (1970); German, Investigation of the Automobile Accident Reparation
System, PROCEEINGS A.B.A. SEC. OF INS., NEG., & Comp. LAw 346 (1969); Ghiardi &

Kircher, Automobile Insurance ReparationPlans:An Analysis of Eight ExistingLaws, 55
MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1972); Keeton & O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward Non-FaultAutomobile Insurance, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1971); Lawton, No-Fault:An Invitation to More
Accidents, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 73 (1972); Note, A SocialInsurance Scheme for Automobile
Accident Compensation, 57 VA. L. REv. 409 (1971).
13. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT
BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCmENTS (1932); Smith,
Lilly, & Dowling, Compensationfor Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L.
REV. 785 (1932).
14. SAS. REV. STAT. ch. 409 (1965).
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rent system is the soaring cost of insurance premiums which
forces many families to do without automobile insurance-an
established necessity of our mobile society.' 5 Additionally, claimants with relatively small claims often obtain excessive compensation" while the more seriously injured receive but a fraction of
their true loss.' 7 Because traffic accident litigation clogs the court
dockets," traffic victims often wait months or even years before
recovery.'" Since the fault system requires an injured plaintiff to
show that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the
defendant,"0 there is a temptation to fabricate evidence which can
only distort the tort liability system and discredit the legal profession. Finally and most importantly, no fault advocates charge
that court costs and attorneys' fees consume a disproportionate
2
amount of the premium dollar. '
The "Basic Protection Plan" proposed by Keeton and
O'Connell was an attempt to alleviate some of the problems in
the current scheme by granting no fault benefits under compulsory first party coverage, while limiting the injured party's right
to sue in tort. 22 First party benefits would cover an insured's "net
economic loss," i.e., medical expenses and wage losses reduced by
sums received from all collateral sources, such as health and accident insurance and workmen's compensation.2 These first party
benefits would be subject to a maximum of $10,000 for each injured victim; recovery in tort would be precluded unless the victim could show either economic loss of more than $10,000 or pain
and suffering exceeding $5,000.24
In 1969, Massachusetts 21 became the first state to enact a
15. S.C. DEP'T OF INS., THE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE PROBLEM IN SoUruH

CAROLINA 1 (1968).
16. REPORT OF THE SPEcIAL COMMITrEE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION ON

"No FAULT" PLANs 30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL CoMmr= REPORT].
17. Bombaugh, The Departmentof Transportation'sAuto InsuranceStudy and Auto"
Accident CompensationReform, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 207, 213 (1971).
18. R. KEErON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 13.
19. P. PRETZEL, supra note 9, at 189.
20. Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile InsuranceReparationPlans:An Analysis of Eight
Existing Laws, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1972).
21. R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, at 69.
22. Id. at 273-95.
23. Id. at 278.
24. Id. at 274-75.
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A & ch. 231, § 6D (Cum. Supp. 1974). See
Ryan, MassachusettsTries No Fault, 57 A.B.A.J. 431 (1971); Note, The Massachusetts
"No Fault"Automobile Insurance Law: An Analysis and Proposed Revision, 8 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 455 (1971).
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modified version of the Keeton-O'Connell proposal. During the
ensuing five years, 24 states have enacted no fault in some form,
with varying degrees of success.2" In addition, nearly every association or organization with any interest in the subject has advanced some form of modified no fault proposal. Statistics and
studies, often yielding contradictory results,2 have abounded.
Moreover, the wide dissimilarity of the various proposals, together with the extremely watered-down tortfeasor exemption
contained in most of the plans adopted thus far, have given rise
to the possibility of a federal no fault act."
It was in this context that the South Carolina General Assembly dealt with the problem of automobile insurance reform.
Although opponents of a no fault measure observed that many of
26. States with codified no fault plans include: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4013
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. 1963, art. 25, §§ 13-25-1 et seq.;
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 38-319 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975); Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (1975); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.30 et seq. (1974); Hawaii,
HAWARI REV. STAT. § 294-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 539 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A,
ch. 231, § 6(D) (Gum. Supp. 1974); Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 500.3101 et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 72A.1492 et seq. (1969); Nevada, NeD. REv.
STAT. § 698.010 et seq. (1975); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1 et seq. (1973); New
York, N.Y. INS. LAW § 670 et seq. (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1974-75); Oregon, ORE.
REV. STAT. § 743.786 et seq. (1975); South Dakota, S.D. COMILED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-7
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974); Texas, TEx. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974). Additionally, six states have recently adopted various
forms of no fault statutes which have not yet been incorporated into their state codes.
They are: Georgia, New Hampshire, Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
See Keeton, No-FaultInsurance: A Status Report, 51 NEB. L. Rav. 183 (1971); Ghiardi &
Kircher, supra note 12; Leone & Beale, State Developments in Auto InsuranceReform: A
CriticalSurvey, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. Rax. 386 (1972).
27, Compare P. PRETZEL, supra note 9, at 191 ("[In Massachusetts] premiums were
indeed reduced more than forty per cent.") with Brainard, Florida:Land of Rising Costs
in No-Fault, TwAL, Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 34 ("[In Florida] the extension of benefits to all
victims without regard to fault created extra costs for the system which were much greater
than the savings in general damages. Therefore, a net increase in system costs resulted.").
Compare R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 10, at 368 ("Deterrence [of accidents]

is not a major factor in the law of automobile claims systems, either in theory or in
practice.") with Lawton, No-Fault: An Invitation to More Accidents, 55 MARQ. L. REv.
73, 84 (1972) ("The adoption of a no-fault system would do far more than remove the
existent deterrents to negligent driving-it would set up an environment in which unsafe
driving habits would no longer be met with social censure."). CompareDEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, THE DILEMMA OF No-FAULT INSURANCE 6 (1970) ("Two most extensive and
reliable national surveys of public attitudes indicate that the people strongly support the
fault concept.") with P. PRETZEL, supra note 9, at 183-84 ("In a nationwide Gallup Poll
taken in 1971, eighty per cent of the people queried either had never heard of the 'no fault'
concept or had no opinion about it.").
28. S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See text accompanying notes 100-04 infra.
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the defects in the existing system, such as a three-to-five year
backlog on court dockets and relatively high premium rates, were
less prevalent in South Carolina than elsewhere,2 9 no one could
dispute the high level of personal injury and property damage
arising out of traffic accidents. Between 1966 and 1973, the number of registered motor vehicles in South Carolina (including
private automobiles, buses, trailers, trucks, and motorcycles) increased by over 41 percent.3 1 In 1973 alone, auto accidents killed
967 South Carolinians," injured 24,440 more,32 and caused
33
$180,000,000 in total damages.
2.

Operative Provisions of the South CarolinaAct

Choosing to follow a moderate course with respect to no fault
coverage, the South Carolina legislature gleaned portions of the
Act from several states Which already had no fault plans of one
kind or another in operation.
a. First Party Coverage Generally
The Act provides that, after October 1, 1974, no policy shall
be issued or renewed34 in South Carolina unless it contains the
minimum first party coverage (Personal Injury Protection (PIP))
as set forth in the statute. Minimum first party benefits include
medical, hospital, and disability payments of up to $1,000 that
are payable without regard to whether the insured was at fault
in causing his injuries.35 In a later passage, the Act more specifically delineates the medical coverage as including
29. SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPoRT, supra note 16, at 29.
30. Telephone interview with Lonnie Way, Head of Inventory and Audit, Motor
Vehicle Division, South Carolina Highway Department, Columbia, S.C., Sept. 2, 1974.
31. S.C. HIGHWAY DEP'T, 1973 TRAFFIc Accmr FAcTS 7 (1974).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. I1, § 1. It should be noted that the Act, by
providing that policies issued or renewed after the effective date of the Act must contain
the required first party coverage, creates an interim period that may cause some confusion. The Act, as written, allows existing policies to remain in effect until their expiration
date. Thus not until October, 1975, when all existing policies have expired, will no fault
become fully operative in South Carolina.
35. Id. The insurance industry has indicated that "first party" coverage will be referred to as "personal injury protection" (PIP) insurance. The required $1,000 of PIP
coverage is said to compensate for "basic economic loss" (BEL), while the optional increments of PIP coverage will be to cover "supplemental economic loss" (SEL).
The first party coverage in South Carolina, which ranges from $1,000 (mandatory) to
$5,000 (optional), compares favorably with other states that have enacted no fault plans
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all reasonable expenses arising from the accident and sustained
within three years from the date thereof for necessary medical,
surgical, Chiropractic, x-ray and dental services, including
prosthetic devices and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services . . ..
Although fairly explicit, this wording leaves room for disagreement between an insured and his first party insurance carrier
concerning what medical expenses are "reasonable" or "necessary." Unless insurance companies and claimants are willing to
act in good faith, the first party provisions of the Act may fail to
accomplish the announced goal of decreasing the number of automobile accident-related lawsuits. In fact, these provisions may
have precisely the opposite effect by creating a new category of
lawsuits between an insured and his first party insurance carrier
to date. Massachusetts provides for a $2,000 mandatory front end coverage, MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (Cum. Supp. 1974). Other states with first party coverage in the
same range are Texas ($2,500), TFx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Connecticut ($5,000), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-320 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Maryland
($2,500), MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 339 (Cum. Supp. 1973); and Florida ($5,000), FiA.
STAT. ANN. § 627-736 (1974). Some states, however, have opted for higher limits, e.g., New
York ($50,000), N.Y. INs. LAW § 671 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1973); Colorado ($100,000),
COLO. REv. STAT. 1963, art. 25 §§ 13-25-1 to -22; and Nevada ($10,000), NEv. Rv. STAT.
§ 698.070 (1973).
36. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. I, § 1. This language is nearly identical to that
describing benefits payable under the "medical payments" coverage of standardized insurance policies and has caused critics of the South Carolina Act to refer to its "no fault"
provisions as "glorified medical payments coverage." Several important differences, however, exist between the no fault provisions of the Act and traditional medical payments
coverage. Heretofore, medical payments coverage has been optional and only occasionally
selected by motorists. Under the Insurance Reform Act, however, the first $1,000 of first
party coverage is mandatory (with optional increments of higher coverage). See text
accompanying note 41 infra. Another significant difference is the time span in which
medical expenses must accrue: the typical medical payments provision requires that such
expenses occur within one year of the date of the accident. See R. KEETON, INSURANcE LAw
BAsic TEXT 75 (1971). The Insurance Reform Act carries a three-year limitation on expenses. Additionally, medical payments endorsements have, until now, extended coverage to
the named insured and to each relative who is a resident of the insured's household. W.
RoDDA, PROPERTY AND LIABmrY INsuRANcE 372 (1966). The Act goes further in applying
first party benefits to any pedestrian injured by the insured motor vehicle. See text
accompanying note 44 infra. Finally, under existing practice, the medical payments insurance carrier may or may not be subrogated to its insured's tort claim against the third
party tortfeasor. See R. KEETON, supra, at 149-50. If subrogation is allowed, the administrative expense entails higher premiums. See text accompanying note 65 infra. If subrogation is not allowed, the insured enjoys a "double recovery" which also increases the overall
cost of insurance. The South Carolina Act resolves the subrogation problems by requiring
that the first party benefits already received be set off against any tort recovery. See text
accompanying note 63 infra.
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over interpretations of the insurance contract.37
Additional benefits under the first party coverage include
recovery for a wage earner of income lost as a result of an accident. 8 If, however, the accident victim is not an income producer,
first party benefits may include expenses necessary and reasonable for the employment of a substitute to perform essential services ordinarily performed by the injured person. 39 For example, if
a nonworking mother is injured and unable to perform such services as cooking or attending to her children, she may be reimbursed for such expenditures as hiring a cook or babysitter.0 Furthermore, each insurer must make available to every applicant,
for an additional premium, elective "alternative benefits levels"
of first party coverage in increments of $1,500, $2,000, $2,500 and
$5,000. 41
Perhaps the most legitimate criticism of the basic no fault
concept is that, in shifting from a liability concept to what is
basically an accident and health system, no fault will cause insurance companies to be less concerned with their insured's potential
for causing loss and more apprehensive about the possibility of
his sustaining loss. The net result, arguably, could be a complete
reversal of roles with respect to who is considered a "good" risk.
Under a no fault scheme, theoretically, the company would be
more concerned with potential payments in the event that its
insured is injured. Thus, the middle-aged family man, with a
relatively high income and several dependents, is a substantially
higher risk than the proverbial hot-rodding teenager, who generally has little income, has few if any dependents, and is usually
more physically capable of withstanding injuries from an accident than his older counterpart. Therefore, the mature, responsi37. One should note that some of the problems may be alleviated by the Act's provision for punitive action which may be taken against companies engaging in "unfair claims
practices." For example, one of the practices listed as unfair is "[n]ot attempting in good
faith to effect prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims ...
" Insurance Reform
Act § 3, art. VII, § 2(4).
38. Id. § 1, art. II, § 1.
39. Id. The Act, as written, requires that expenses for such substitute services be
actually incurredbefore they are compensable under the first party coverage.
40. Although the wife who performs essential household services is the most obvious
example, other situations may present more perplexing problems. Most of the difficulty
will probably center on an interpretation of what constitutes "essential" services. For
example, what of the husband who regularly performs household maintenance chores or
tends to a garden in his spare time?
41. Id. § 1, art. II, § 2. Some insurance carriers in South Carolina have indicated that
they intend to offer PIP coverage in excess of the amounts required to be offered.
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ble, and safe-driving motorist would be forced to pay higher
premiums under a no fault scheme.4"
This phenomenon, however, should not be a problem in
South Carolina for several reasons. First, the PIP coverage will be
limited in most cases to $1,000 unless the public is educated
about the benefit of optional coverage. When a high income
earner does opt for the extra increments of first party coverage by
paying an additional premium, his recovery will still be limited
to a maximum of $5,000. Therefore, a company insuring a
$45,000-a-year business executive who is involved in an accident
that is not of his own making will not have to cover more than
$5,000 of his lost wages. A second factor militating against disproportionate premiums for safe drivers is the comprehensive merit
rating apparatus that is developed by the Act."
b.

Persons Covered
Persons entitled to first party coverage under the Act include
the named insured and members of his family residing in his
household, . . . other persons injured while occupying the insured motor vehicle as a guest or passenger or while using it with
the express or implied permission of the named insured, ...
and pedestrians injured in an accident in which the insured
motor vehicle is involved."

With the exception of pedestrians, this provision is almost identical to the coverage provided in the "omnibus clause" of the standard insurance policy required by section 46-750.32 of the South
Carolina Code." The addition of pedestrian coverage is significant because it allows any pedestrian (even one who does not own
an automobile) to recover the specified first party benefits from
the insurance carrier of the motorist who injures him, without
regard to fault.
With respect to persons covered by no fault insurance, opponents of no fault plans emphasize that the tendency to suppress
or fabricate evidence, an undesirable but inevitable component
42. SPECIAL CommizrrEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 27. For a more elaborate discussion
of this problem, see DEFENSE REsARcH INmTruTE, FEDERAL "No FAULT" INSURANCE, AN
ANALYSIS AND CRMQuE

28-30 (1974).

43. Insurance Reform Act § 3. The merit rating plan will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of the South CarolinaLaw Review.
44. Id. § 1, art. II, § 1.
45. S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 46-750.32

(Cum. Supp. 1973).
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of the fault system, will survive under the supposedly more enlightened no fault concept. To secure PIP coverage, an injured
party may strive to invent evidence to prove that his injuries
arose out of a motor vehicle accident." While this may be true to
a degree, unscrupulous tactics will exist in any system of insurance, and there would seem to be less opportunity to fabricate
evidence which demonstrates that one's injuries are automobilerelated than, for example, to attempt to show in another context
that one's injuries are work-related within the purview of workmen's compensation.
c.

Setoff Provisions

The original no fault plan, as proposed by Professors Keeton
and O'Connell, included a substantial restriction on the right to
sue in tort." Unless a victim could show economic loss greater
than $10,000 or at least $5,000 in pain and suffering, tort actions
were precluded entirely. This "threshold" type limitation on tort
actions has been described as one of the two primary components
of a true "no fault" plan, 8 the other being first party benefits
payable regardless of fault. The Massachusetts version contained
a lower threshold limitation; a claimant was barred from suing
for pain and suffering unless his medical expenses exceeded $500
or the injury resulted in death, the loss of a body member, or
49
other serious disfigurement.
At one time during its legislative history, the South Carolina
Act contained a threshold provision. The House version of the
bill, which went to the conference committee," contained both a
requirement of $2,500 mandatory first party coverage and a provision that tort recovery was prohibited unless medical and hospital
expenses exceeded $500 or the injury resulted in permanent disfigurement, serious bone fractures, loss of a body member, permanent injury or permanent loss of bodily function, or death. The
46. SPECIAL COMMTrEE REPoRT, supra note 16, at 31.
47. R. KEEroN & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 323.
48. P. PRETZEL, supra note 9, at 192-97.
49. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6D (Cum. Supp. 1974). Clearly, it was the
concept of tort limitation which disturbed the practicing bar, perhaps not without some
justification. Any cut-off figure, be it $500 or $10,000, is arbitrary and gives rise to serious
constitutional questions. Rubens & Williams, The Constitutionalityof Basic Protection,
1 CONN. L. REV. 44 (1968). See also notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text.
50. S. 371, (as amended second time, April 4, 1974) 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d
Sess. (1974).
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Senate version,-" on the other hand, contained a provision for
optional first party coverage and no limitation on the right to sue.
These variations were the primary points of contention between
the two chambers and were the major reason the measure remained deadlocked in conference committee for most of the legis2
lative session.
Most court challenges to threshold limitations in other states
have focused on the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution 3 and the constitutions of nearly all states (including
South Carolina)5 as well as other guarantees such as due process
and equal protection. With few exceptions, these attacks have
51. S. 371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1974).
52. See note 3 supra.
53, U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
54. S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 25 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall be preserved
inviolate."
55. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971), the first actual case
testing the constitutionality of the no fault concept. In Pinnick, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts statute against a variety of constitutional attacks.
In dismissing the plaintiff's due process argument, the court observed that the Act "bore
a rational relation to a permissible legislative objective." 271 N.E.2d at 601-05. The court
listed some of the permissible objectives of the statute as, inter alia, relieving court
congestion, reducing the cost of automobile insurance, and correcting other inequities in
the present system. Further, the court held that the statute, by establishing a system for
certain and prompt recovery, while at the same time creating a limited exemption from
tort liability, satisfied any constitutional requirement that it provide a reasonable substitute for prior rights existing at common law. With regard to specific provisions of the Act,
the court said that the requirement of the Massachusetts plan that all motorists insure
against loss to themselves through a private, profit-making corporation did not violate due
process requirements, because "[amny doubts as to the power of the Legislature to require
the citizen, for the good of the public as a whole, to take measures for his own benefit
have long since been settled . . . ." 271 N.E.2d at 607. Finally, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim that arbitrary and unreasonable criteria had been established for determining when pain and suffering are recoverable. Recognizing that the purpose of such a
provision was to eliminate minor claims for pain and suffering, the court held that the
$500 threshold provision was not "arbitrary" or "unreasonable."
See also Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), a case involving a
broadside attack on the Florida no fault plan. Constitutional infirmities alleged by the
plaintiffs included: deprivation of the right to trial by jury, denial of due process and equal
protection, violation of the right of access to the courts, and infringement of the right of
nonresidents to travel. The court held the plan constitutional in all respects but one: the
threshold limitation on the right to bring a tort action was partially invalidated on equal
protection grounds. The Act purported to limit tort actions against another motorist
unless medical expenses were in excess of $1,000 or unless the injury consisted in whole
or in part of a fracture to a weight-bearing bone or of a compound fracture. According to
the court, this arrangement would allow a motorist with a broken little toe to maintain a
tort action, but a driver who received a fractured skull would be precluded from suing.
This incongruous result arises because the little toe is classified as a "weight-bearing
bone," and the skull is not. Such a result does not rest on a rational basis, and thus the
"bone fracture" threshold exemption was invalidated.
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not been successful in invalidating reasonable threshold limitations." The jury trial requirement, for example, has been sidestepped by a rationalization that a statute abolishing all right of
recovery in certain instances leaves nothing to be tried by a jury.
Thus the right to a jury trial is not being impinged. 7 A curious
question presents itself, however, with respect to a related provision in the South Carolina Constitution. Article I, section 9 provides: "All courts shall be public, and every person shall have
speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained.""5 This section has59
been held to be applicable to injuries "to person or property.
One could argue that this section guarantees persons with any
injury, such as an injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident,
the right to go into court for remedial relief, and such a construction would obviously conflict with any threshold bar on tort actions. 0
The problem of threshold limitations on tort recovery has
been mooted in South Carolina because the threshold approach
was discarded by the conference committee. The plan which finally emerged from the committee appears to be a reasonable,
workable compromise. Adopting what some critics have pejoratively referred to as "pseudo no fault,"" the committee reported
out a version containing the mandatory first party coverage discussed above, but with no limitation on the right to sue. 2 If,
however, suit is brought and a judgment is obtained against the
56. The most successful judicial attack against no fault insurance to date occurred
in Illinois. In Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the state's no fault law limiting recovery for pain and suffering by all
injured motorists conflicted with the state constitutional prohibition against special laws.
Additionally, a provision establishing compulsory arbitration was invalidated as denying
the right of a jury trial, also guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.
57. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 22 (Fla. 1974).
58. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
59. State v. Lagerquist, 254 S.C. 501, 176 S.E.2d 141 (1970).
60. A similar approach was used to invalidate a no fault threshold provision as it
applied to property damage claims in Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). See note
113 infra. Militating against such an approach, however, is the fact that this section of
the South Carolina Constitution was in force when the workmen's compensation statute
was enacted and caused no problems for that legislation. The analogous treatment of tort
actions under workmen's compensation and no fault, barring certain types of tort actions,
is grounded on an identical need: a trade-off of rights of action for a prompt and definite
recovery.
61. P. PRETZEL, supra note 9, at 192-97.
62. The Act specifically provides that "[n]othing in this act shall be deemed to
affect the rights of any person to claim and sue for damages. . . sustained by him as a
result of a motor vehicle accident." Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 4(f).
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third party tortfeasor, the amount actually recovered from him
or his insurance carrier is reduced by the $1,000 first party benefits already received." That is, a setoff provision operates to insure that there shall be no double recovery with respect to the
required $1,000 of first party benefits.
On the other hand, subrogation by the first party insurance
carrier is expressly prohibited." The legislature felt that a setoff
provision Wvould be more economical and administratively feasible than a provision allowing subrogation by the first party insurance carrier. To illustrate: if A and B are involved in an accident
and A recovers from his own carrier the $1,000 first party benefits,
he may still sue B and obtain a jury verdict for his full measure
of damages including pain and suffering. After the verdict is returned, the trial judge then reduces this amount by $1,000, or a
lesser sum, corresponding to the dollar amount of first party benefits the plaintiff has already received. B's liability insurance
carrier thus enjoys a savings of $1,000. To allow A's carrier to be
subrogated to A's claim against B, and ultimately against B's
carrier, for the $1,000 in benefits paid to A, would cause unjustifiable administrative expenses. A setoff provision in lieu of subrogation is more desirable. Although B's carrier saves $1,000 at the
expense of A's carrier in the example discussed, their roles will
be reversed when another party insured by B's carrier recovers
from a party insured by A's carrier. Equalization of claims among
the various insurance carriers is predictable over an extended
period of time, and the administrative savings inherent in not
pursuing the initial $1,000 paid to first party insureds will be
equally distributed among participating companies. 5
63. Id. § 1, art. H1,§ 2A(b). The setoff provision applies also to amounts received by
way of settlement. Id,
64. Id. § 1, art. 11, § 1: "No benefit payable pursuant to this section shall be subject
to subrogation or assignment except as provided for in Article 11-B [sic]." (Article 11-A,
refers to subrogation allowable under the designated claims plan.)
65. This idea is expressed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell in their book, Basic
Protection for the Traffic Victim. In referring to the current system which exists with
respect to collision coverage they state:
Surely a net saving could be effected for the motoring public by eliminating the
waste that now occurs when a subrogated collision insurer of one motorist sues
the property damage liability insurer of another motorist involved in an accident-the waste incident to a second round of loss shifting after the loss has
already been paid by one insurer.
R. KEnTON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 530-31. It should be noted that the insurance
industry in South Carolina favored the setoff approach which was adopted, as opposed to
a provision allowing subrogation.
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Several no fault states have refused to adopt the threshold
tortfeasor exemption. Whether this is attributable to serious
doubts concerning the constitutional validity of such a provision, 6 to an aggressive lobby on the part of the plaintiffs' bar, or
to both, is a matter of speculation. Most states that have no
arbitrary threshold limitation have adopted provisions preserving
the right to sue67 but allowing the first party insurance carrier to
be subrogated to.the tort claim of its insured."8 To date, of the
eight no fault states without any tortfeasor exemption or threshold limitation, 9 only Oregon maintains a setoff of first party benefits from tort recovery 0 similar to the South Carolina system.
The remaining states allow either a double recovery on the part
of the insured or provide for subrogation. For the reasons discussed above,'7 a setoff approach is more desirable from an administrative standpoint, at least in states where low first party
benefits indicate that the subrogation process is not costjustified.
Several observations should be made concerning the South
Carolina setoff provision. First, the setoff requirements are only
applicable to the required first party coverage; that is, the first
$1,000 of PIP benefits an insured receives. Persons who opt for the
higher limits of first party coverage can recover that amount from
their own company and still recover from a third party tortfeasor
without having to set off the higher increments of first party
coverage for which they have paid an additional premium. Bulletins from some insurance associations indicating that all first
66. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
67. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4018 (Cum. Supp. 1973): "Tort liability arising from
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle within this State is retained."
68. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4019 (Cum. Supp. 1973): "[Ihe insurer paying such
[first party] benefits has a right of reimbursement and credit out of the tort recovery or
settlement . .. ."
69. Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4018 (Cum. Supp. 1973); Maryland, MD. CoDE
ANN. art. 48A, § 542 (Cum. Supp. 1973); Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.26 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. ANN. § 743.835 (1974); South Dakota, S.D. ComPiLED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-8 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Texas, TEx. INs. CODE art. 5.06-3(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1974); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
70. ORE. REv. STAT. ANN. § 743.835 (1974) provides:
Payment of any [first party benefits] shall be applied in reduction of the
amount of damage that the insured may be entitled to recover from any insurer
under bodily liability or uninsured motorist coverage for the same accident.
Although the Illinois act contained a setoff provision similar to its Oregon and South
Carolina counterparts, the Illinois no fault plan has been declared unconstitutional. See
note 56 supra.
71. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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party coverage must be set off72 are contrary to both the clear
legislative history of the measure and the reasonable interpreta73
tion of the statute.
A second factor of concern is the wording of the setoff provision: "[I]f a claimant recovering from his insurer . . . [the required $1,000 of first party benefits] shall bring action against
72. S.C. Ass'N oF INS. AGEMS, BuLL. No. 74-19 (July 5, 1974):
Wf the insured brings suit and recovers, the first thousand dollars his own
company has paid him must be returned. This was the legislative intent of the
Conference Committee, but a careful reading of the law gives us the opinion that
any amount of first party coverage would be offset.
73. One member of the conference committee that drafted the "setoff compromise"
has stated unequivocally that the committee intended to require that only the first $1,000
of first party benefits be set off. Unfortunately, the actual language of the statute is
somewhat unclear in this regard. One passage provides:
If a claimant recovering from his insurer the benefits for economic loss required
by SECTION 1, Article II, Section 1 shall bring action or make claim against
another person who has furnished security pursuant to this act, such claimant
may plead and prove in his action or claim against the other person the economic loss for which he has been reimbursed but after verdict in his favor the
court shall reduce such verdict by the amount of the benefits paid for economic
loss by the claimant's insurer and any voluntary settlement effected by or between the claimant and such other person or his insurer shall similarly be
reduced in respect to expenses for economic loss previously recovered by the
claimant from his insurer.
Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 2A(b) (emphasis added). The first party coverage
"required by SECTION 1, Article 11, Section 1" is the $1,000 mandatory benefits. The
optional increments of first party coverage of up to $5,000 are set forth in section 1, article
II, § 2. Thus, it would appear from this provision that the only setoff required by the Act
is that of the first $1,000 of coverage.
Confusion with respect to the setoff is caused by a later passage that provides:
"[B]enefits received or recovered under the no-fault provisions required by Section 1,
Article I of this act shall be deducted from any tort recovery, settlement, or judgment for
§ 4(). This provision is ambiguous in
bodily injury." Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. If,
that § 1, art. I of the Act, to which the quoted passage refers, is essentially a preamble,
setting forth the title and scope of the Act. Thus, this latter provision regarding setoff does
not explicitly refer to either the $1,000 mandatory or the $5,000 optional first party benefits. Arguably, it refers only to the first $1,000, since that is the only amount of no fault
coverage "required" by the Act. The extra increments of first party coverage must, of
course, be offered on an optional basis and for an additional premium, but the Act does
not "require" that motorists carry this much first party coverage. Nevertheless, § 1, art.
If,
§ 2A(b) of the Act, quoted above, explicitly keys the setoff provision to the mandatory
$1,000 of coverage and should control over the ambiguous language of § 1, art. I, § 4().
Moreover, strong policy reasons exist for requiring a setoff of only $1,000. The prudent
individual who chooses to pay an additional premium for first party coverage should not
be penalized by having to forego a part of his tort recovery from a third party. The
arguments, that double recovery generally ought to be avoided and that the prudent man,
in carrying extra insurance, never takes into consideration the vagaries of tort litigation
in estimating his insurance needs, are countered by the observations that this factor of
extra coverage could not realistically be inserted into the rate structure to become part of
the system.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss5/3

16

et al.: The South Carolina Insurance Reform Act (Part I): "No Fault" and
1975]

INSURANCE REFORM ACT

another person . . . the court shall reduce such verdict by the
amount of the benefits paid. . . . "7 Thus the section appears
only to require a setoff by those persons who have already
received first party benefits from their own carrier. Conceivably
one could attempt to sue the third party and recover in full before
applying to one's own carrier for the first party coverage, thereby
avoiding the setoff requirements. It is likely, however, that a
court would see through such devious tactics and not allow a
claimant to circumvent the provision by simply reversing the
usual order of recovery. 75
It should also be noted that the Act provides that any first
party benefits recovered shall be reduced to the extent that the
claimant has received workmen's compensation payments arising
out of the same accident. 71 The setoff and workmen's compensation provisions will serve to destroy partially the "collateral
77
source rule" recently enunciated in Powers v. Temple:
As a general rule, total or partial compensation for an injury
which the injured party receives from a collateral source wholly
independent of the wrongdoer does not operate to lessen the
damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. 8
Although the Act will partially abrogate this rule, in that first
party benefits as well as workmen's compensation benefits will
reduce the total amount recoverable, collateral benefits from
other sources will continue to be disregarded in setting third party
liability.
The setoff provision operates on the assumption that insurance companies will enjoy savings by not having to contribute to
what is effectively a double recovery for their insureds and will
in turn pass the savings on to the consumer in the form of reduced
premiums. The South Carolina approach to collateral benefits is
much more conservative than, for example, the New Jersey
plan, 79 which provides that both workmen's compensation and
74. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 2A(b) (emphasis added).
75. Another reason why such tactics probably will not be successful is a provision in
the Act allowing insurance companies to require that the first party claim be presented
within six months of the accident. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 5(a). In light of
the congested state of most common pleas dockets, it is doubtful that many lawsuits could
be filed and tried before the plaintiff actually receives his first party benefits.
76. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 4(d).
77. 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967).
78. Id. at 158, 156 S.E.2d at 763.
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6 (1973).
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benefits such as those received under employee temporary disability benefit statutes and federal medicare are deducted from the
PIP recovery. Plans like the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection
Plan and the New Jersey plan, which require recognition of substantially all collateral benefits, go too far in an effort to secure
overall savings for the automobile insurance purchaser. They
tend to penalize the farsighted or prudent insured who chooses to
purchase hospitalization insurance or wage loss insurance as
extra protection in the event of an accident. Moreover, such auto
insurance plans tend to "parasitically feed off of these collateral
sources in order to keep down the cost.""0 The South Carolina
variation, offsetting only workmen's compensation benefits,
which are generally payable to all workers without their paying
any premiums, is clearly the more equitable.
A possible problem with the setoff provision, which has
caused some concern among plaintiffs' attorneys, arises because
the actual setting off of the first party benefits is administered by
the trial judge after the jury has already returned a verdict for the
plaintiff."1 The fear among the plaintiffs' bar is that jurors, familiar with the mandatory first party benefits from having had to
purchase them themselves but "kept in the dark" with regard to
the operation of the setoff, might consciously reduce their verdicts on the assumption that the plaintiff has already received
some compensation for his accident. Then, when an additional
amount is deducted by the trial judge, the plaintiff walks out of
court undercompensated. This problem, however, could possibly
be corrected by proper instructions to the jury. Any such instruction would be a delicate task for the trial judge who must of
course refrain from suggesting that the plaintiff should win. But
the longstanding rule against mention of insurance during trial
might need to be reconsidered. The South Carolina Insurance
Reform Act mandates that all South Carolina motorists carry the
first party and liability insurance required by the Act. Thus,
except in cases involving out-of-state motorists or persons who do
not comply with the Act, all litigants will be covered by insurance. The argument could therefore be made that since the jury
will assume insurance coverage anyway (if they have not already
been doing so), it would be better to be completely candid with
the jury concerning the specifics of the insurance coverage and
80. SPECIAL COMMITFEE REPoRT, supra note 16, at 39-40.

81. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II,§ 2A(b).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss5/3

18

et al.: The South Carolina Insurance Reform Act (Part I): "No Fault" and

1975]

INSURANCE REFORM ACT

the operation of the setoff. The concomitant disadvantage, however, is the ever-present possibility that jurors will, consciously
or subconsciously, return excessive verdicts when the factor of
insurance is directly brought to their attention.
A related problem with respect to the operation of setoff can
be dismissed as a trivial technicality. The setoff provision provides that a person who has received first party benefits from his
own company may still "plead and prove [in a tort action]
against the other person the economic loss for which he has been
reimbursed .....

,1 Since this passage only refers to recovery for

economic loss from a third party tortfeasor, and since the title
page of the Act describes first party benefits as including "medical, hospital, disability, and economic loss," ' one could interpret
the Act as precluding recovery by a plaintiff of anything other
than "economic loss." Thus, a plaintiff would be barred from
recovering his medical and hospital expenses from the third party
tortfeasor. It is obvious that this interpretation is devoid of merit
since it is inconsistent with the clear intent of the legislature, as
well as with a later provision in the Act which reiterates that tort
liability is retained:
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to affect the right of any
person to claim and sue for damages, as provided by law, sustained by himself as the result of a motor vehicle accident except that benefits received or recovered under the no-fault provisions required by Section 1, Article I [sic] of this act shall be
deducted from any tort recovery, settlement, or judgment for
bodily injury."
This section makes it clear that a plaintiff may still bring an
action to recover any damages formerly cognizable at law, with
the additional requirement that the verdict obtained must be
reduced by the amount of mandatory first party benefits already
received.
d. Designated Claims Plan
The designated claims plan,85 a provision of the "no fault"
section of the Act often referred to as an "Assigned Claims Plan,"
was intended
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id., Title Page.

84. Id. § 1, art. 11, § 4(f).
85. Id. § 1, art. 11-A.
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to provide the first-party, no-fault benefits contemplated by the
Act to persons in good faith entitled to such benefits but who
are unable to receive them for reasons other than their own
defaults, such as, for example, the fact that a non-car-owning
pedestrian was struck by an out-of-state motor vehicle, or that
the insurer or self-insured person obligated for first-party benefits is financially unable to provide them or to provide them in
full. 0
Under the established plan itself,"7 any person who has suffered
economic loss as a result of an accidental injury arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle and who is unable to receive first
party benefits because of the financial inability of an insurer or
other reasons beyond the control of the insured, may apply to the
governing committee of the designated claims plan and receive
the $1,000 first party benefits to which he is rightfully entitled.
A person applying for designated claim benefits must do so
within one year from the date of his accident.8 The claim, which
is to be accompanied by full information about the accident as
well as sufficient documentation of the claimant's economic loss,
is to be filed with the Designated Claims Plan Office of the South
Carolina Insurance Department. 9 One significant departure from
the first party coverage section's prohibition against subrogation
allows the designated claims plan or any insurer to whom the
claim is assigned to be subrogated "to the extent of the benefits
received by the claimant from any person liable. . . to the claimant.""0 The obvious reason for allowing subrogation is that the
equalizing effect caused by the operation of setoff is not present
in the situation involving recalcitrant insurers, and to allow recovery from the designated claims fund without any provision for
subrogation would soon deplete the fund.
e.

Miscellaneous Provisions
Anticipating that the same insurance carrier might have the

86. S.C. DEP'T OF INsuRNca, BuLL.No. 17-74, Fr INTraaEMv BuLLEFIN ON S-371,
at 14 (July 12, 1974).
87. S.C. DEP'T OF INSURAN CE, BuLL. No. 29-74, DESIGNATED CLAIMS PLAN-PLAN OF
OPERATION (Sept. 26, 1974). Those insurers and qualified self-insurers, who are required
by the Act to participate in the plan by § 1, art. II, § 9, are to be assessed each year on
the basis of their relative premium volume in South Carolina in order to provide funding
for the plan. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. 1-A, § (b).
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first party coverage on an injured motorist as well as the liability
coverage on the other driver who was at fault, the drafters wisely
inserted a safeguard against insurance companies who might attempt to coerce the injured motorist into signing a general release
or covenant not to sue in return for the first party benefits he
receives. The Act provides that no such agreements are valid
unless (1) the insured has been given a disclosure statement fully
informing him that first party benefits are contractual in nature
and are totally unrelated to any tort claim he may have against
the other motorist and (2) a cooling-off period of three days has
elapsed. 1
Another contingency specifically provided for is the situation
which arises when an accident occurs between a motorist who has
purchased the required "no fault" coverage and someone who has
not; for example, an out-of-state motorist or a railroad. In these
cases, the Act does not allow the party who has not "paid his
way" into the no fault system to benefit from the $1,000 setoff
provision, because it would be unfair "for the savings inherent in
the setoff to inure to the benefit of a different reparation system
where such savings could not help to reduce liability insurance
rates. 9' 2 Accordipigly, in such situations there is no setoff, and
that part of the recovery representing the first party benefits
already received is held in trust for the claimant's own first party
93
carrier.
In addition, first party benefits are required to be paid "periodically as the claims therefor arise and within thirty days after
satisfactory proof thereof is received." 94 This is consistent with
the general scheme of providing a prompt, definite recovery for
injured motorists. Insurance policies may provide that the first
party benefits are not recoverable by persons who (a) intention91. Id. § 1, art. II, § 2A(a). The cooling-off period runs from the later event of either
(a) the delivery of the disclosure statement or (b) the payment or settlement of first party
benefits and execution of the general release.
92. S.C. DEP'T OF INsURANcE, BuLL. No. 17-74, FIRST INTERPRETIVE BuLuMn

ON S-371,

at 7 (July 12, 1974).
93. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 2A(c). Presumably the kind of "trust" referred
to by the Act is analogous to a "constructive trust" imposed by a court of equity. Such a
trust is described by Bogert as
not a trust in which the trustee is to have duties of administration lasting for
an appreciable period of time, but rather a passive, temporary trust, in which
the trustee's sole duty is to transfer the title and possession to the beneficiary.
G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 77, at 209 (4th ed. 1963). Thus the insured who recovers from
a third party tortfeasor will be required to reimburse promptly his own first party carrier.
94. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 5.
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ally cause the accident, (b) are injured while operating a stolen
vehicle, committing a felony, or violating the law by failing to
stop when signaled by an officer, or (c) are operating motorcycles.9"
Liability insurance coverage is, quite naturally, retained,
and the minimum coverages are raised from $10,000 to $15,000 for
injury to any one person and from $20,000 to $30,000 for injury
to two or more persons injured in an accident." Property damage
liability coverage remains at $5,000.11 Another desirable change
is the provision under which an insurance company and a named
insured may agree that a designated natural person is to be excluded from the policy coverage." This will alleviate the problem
often faced by the owner of a family policy, who, along with his
wife, has a relatively safe driving record but is forced to pay
higher premiums because another member of the family, such as
a teenager with a bad driving record, is by definition also included in the policy coverage. The accident-prone member of the
family can now be excluded from the policy, but only if (1) his
license has been revoked and turned into the highway department
or (2) an appropriate policy of insurance has been executed in his
99
own name.

3. No Fault on the FederalLevel
A complete discussion of no fault automobile insurance
ought to refer to a bill proposing a nationwide no. fault plan,
which has been passed by the United States Senate and is under
consideration by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee. 0 This plan, although currently stalled in committee,
is considered by many as having at least a fair chance of passage.
The bill is divided into three titles: Title I sets forth defini95. Id. § 1, art. II, § 6(a)-(d). There is no provision allowing insurers to exclude
motorists under the influence of drugs or alcohol, as is found in most no fault enactments.
E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 73, § 1065.152(2) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974). The omission
of this language from the list of exclusions gives rise to these conflicting interpretations
about the legislative intent: (1) risks associated with alcohol and drugs ought to be incurred by the insurer because they are frequently encountered experiences; (2) "may be
excluded" implies neutrality; (3) the omission was a total oversight.
96. Insurance Reform Act § 4, amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.11(1) [sic] (Cum.
Supp. 1973). (This section actually amended § 46-750.32.)
97. Insurance Reform Act § 4.
98. Id. § 1, art. 1I, § 14.
99. Id.
100. S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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tions and administrative matters; Title H1 establishes the minimum no fault provisions that must be incorporated into the insurance laws of each state; and Title III is an alternate plan that will
automatically become effective in any state failing to adopt the
requirements of Title H1 by the end of its first legislative session
after the federal bill becomes law.1"'
The standards established by Title H1 are more demanding
than any that have been seriously considered, let alone adopted,
by any state thus far. First party benefits include all medical
expenses, work loss benefits of up to $1,000 a month, replacement
services and funeral expenses. Tort liability is abolished in all
cases except those involving (a) an uninsured motorist, (b) an
improperly manufactured car, (c) intentional injury, (d) economic loss not compensated by the state's first party plan, and
(e) damages for "noneconomic detriment" if the accident results
in death, disfigurement, or more than 90 days of total disability.' 2
Title Ill is very similar to Title II, except that it provides for even
more drastic restrictions on the right to sue.
It is obvious that the South Carolina plan does not measure
up to the standards enunciated in Title H. Therefore, in the event
the federal bill becomes law, South Carolina, as well as all 49
other states, would have to alter drastically its insurance laws in
favor of an untested and radically different national policy.
The federal bill, however, does provide for a four-year respite
period for states designated as "no fault" states. More specifically, the one-year period allowed for a state to adopt Title H1 is
extended to four years if the state has adopted, by September 1,
1975, a no fault plan with certain minimum provisions which are
substantially less demanding than those found in Title H11.3
These standards include compulsory motor vehicle insurance,
payment of PIP benefits without regard to fault in an amount of
not less than $2,000, and some sort of tortfeasor exemption or
threshold limitation on the right to sue. It can readily be seen that
the version of the South Carolina Act passed by the House of
Representatives would meet these standards. 0 ' Therefore, if the
federal bill ever becomes law, South Carolina could quickly adopt
the House version (which has already been studied and re101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. § 201.
Id. § 206(a).
Id. § 201(g).
See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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searched) and thereby gain an additional four years in which to
adopt Title II. The state would have to comply eventually with
the provisions of Title II or be faced with the more stiingent
requirements of Title III. Nevertheless, by moving to the House
version of the Insurance Reform Act as an interim step, South
Carolina would be given additional time in which to comply.
B.

Property DamageArbitration
1. No Fault and PropertyDamage Generally

The term "property damage," when used with reference to
automobile accidents, generally connotes the physical damage to
the automobiles involved. The term, however, includes a variety
of damages: physical destruction by an automobile of such things
as luggage or clothing and of property along the highway, such as
05
shrubbery or buildings."
Collision coverage on an optional basis has been a standard
feature of conventional automobile insurance policies for some
time.' 0 Since this coverage provides for reimbursement to an insured for any loss he incurs due to the damages to his own automobile, it is "first party" or "no fault" coverage in a limited
sense.'0 ' Collision coverage has been most popular among owners
of newer and more expensive automobiles. As an automobile ages
and becomes less valuable, collision coverage is often dropped
entirely. A motorist who chooses not to purchase collision insurance must successfully wage a tort action against the'other driver
in order to be reimbursed for damages to his own vehicle. In
addition, collision coverage embraces only physical damage to
one's automobile; it is necessary to engage in tort litigation in
order to recover for the destruction of personal property within
the automobile or property along the highway.
The questions of how, and to what extent, property damage
reparations should be included in a no fault plan have not been
handled consistently by the various no fault advocates. Determining that the existing system with respect to property damage
was adequate, early no fault proponents reasoned:
(1) The claims are usually small and are rarely litigated. (2) The
105. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 362.
106. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw BAsIc TExT 310 (1971).
107. See note 11 supra. The insurance carrier is, however, subrogated to its insured's
tort claim against the third party tortfeasor.
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social effects, where compensation is not obtained, are inconsequential as compared with the social effects of serious bodily
injury or death. (3) The loss usually falls on the motorists who,
as a class, are able to protect themselves by insurance or other
means. (4) To include property damage would substantially increase the required insurance premium thus making the plan
unduly burdensome to all persons operating motor cars.' 5
Accordingly, the Columbia Plan of 1932 did not include compensation for property damage in its first party coverage, and thus
that plan retained the common law right of a tort action to recover such loss."0 9 Professors Keeton and O'Connell considered a
variety of alternatives ° before arriving at a basic protection proposal essentially identical to the Columbia Plan-no coverage for
property damage loss under Basic Protection benefits and express
retention of tort actions for those damages."' That approach is
inequitable, however, because the individuals least able to purchase collision coverage, for example, low-income, one-car families, are the very persons least able to sustain property losses."'
Nevertheless, most no fault states have chosen to exclude property damage from any type of mandatory first party coverage"'
108. Smith, The Problem and Its Solution, in Smith, Lilly and Dowling,
Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 785, 798
(1932).

109. R. KEErON & J. O'CoNNE, supra note 10, at 136.
110. Id. at 362.
111. Id. at 367.
112. Note, A Social Insurance Scheme for Automobile Accident Compensation, 57
VA. L. REv. 409, 440 (1971).
113. The complications that can flow from an attempt to integrate property damage
provisions into a threshold type no fault law are illustrated by recent developments in
Florida. The Florida Act provided that a motorist must look to property damage coverage
by his own insurer to compensate for damage to his vehicle. The right of action in tort
against the other driver was abolished unless the plaintiff (1) had chosen not to purchase
property damage insurance and (2) had suffered property damage in excess of $550. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1974). In Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), the Florida
Supreme Court held the property damage part of the act invalid as violating a provision
in the Florida Constitution providing that "[tihe courts shall be open to every person
for redress of any injury. . . ." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21. The court said:
[Tihe Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a
reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress
for injuries, unless the legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity can be shown.
281 So. 2d at 4. Some plans, however, such as Delaware's, DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §
211(a)(3) (Supp. 1972), have rather extensive property damage benefits, covering property
"in or upon" as well as property "not in or upon" the insured vehicle, which must be
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2. PropertyDamage Arbitration in South Carolina
Following the lead of other states, South Carolina has excluded property damage from the first party benefits offered' 4
and left recovery for damages to a motorist's automobile or other
personal or real property to tort litigation involving traditional
fault concepts. The Act also specifically requires that collision
coverage be made available to any individual who requests it."'
Provision is made for optional deductibles of up to $250.111 In
addition, the Act offers an attractive, innovative method for settling property damage disputes: arbitration before a three-person
panel of attorney/arbitrators.
The arbitration mechanism of the South Carolina Act'17 is a
diluted version of what was originally proposed by the Gasque
Committee. "8 The original proposal called for the establishment
of the "South Carolina Arbitration Commission," which would
consist of seven full-time commissioners, to hear disputes involving property damage arising out of automobile accidents. As proposed by the Gasque Committee, the Commission would be a
state agency modeled after the state Industrial Commission.
Claims were to be filed with the clerk of court and the Commission would assign a single arbitrator to hear the matter in the
county where the claim was filed. His decision would be appealable to the court of common pleas, where the appealing litigant
would receive a trial de novo."5
This proposal aroused little debate when the insurance bill
was considered; both the House and Senate versions of the bill
recognized the establishment of this statewide commission. But
the version reported out of the conference committee and later
enacted into law rejected the state agency approach, apparently
in an effort to keep the property damage feature of automobile
accident reparations within the judiciary.
The present section adopts a nonmandatory approach for
arbitration: "Any person who is a party to the disputed property
damage liability claim may submit his claim for determination
offered by all insurance carriers. The decision to participate in such a property damage
program is, of course, purely optional.
114. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
115. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 3(c).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 1, art. I.
118. S. 371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1974).
119. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. I, § 7.
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through arbitration." 2 ' The Act is not clear whether both parties
must agree to arbitrate or whether one party can force arbitration
by filing his claim and asking that it be placed on the arbitration
docket. Even if the Act is construed as allowing one party to force
arbitration upon another, however, the opposing party could simply announce that he intended to utilize his right, provided for
in the Act, to appeal to the court of common pleas for a trial de
novo, and thereby nullify the entire arbitration session. In such
cases, the party who desires arbitration might well decide to sue
directly in common pleas and thus save the time and expense of
useless arbitration.
The conference committee might well have been observing
constitutional guidelines when it fashioned the mechanics of the
arbitration section. There has been much discussion, by both the
treatise writers and the courts, concerning mandatory arbitration
vis-a-vis the constitutional right to a jury trial.'2' In addition to
the federal requirement,12 constitutions in all states except two
(Colorado and Louisiana) contain provisions guaranteeing the
right to a jury trial.'2 It should be noted, however, that at least
one case held compulsory arbitration of small claims to be constitutional when the scheme also provided that an unsatisfied party
could appeal and receive a trial de novo.' 24 Similarly, the South
Carolina version, providing for an optional first step of arbitration
together with a right of appeal to common pleas, should not run
afoul of state constitutional provisions.
The arbitration section also should withstand scrutiny under
the doctrine enunciated by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Childs v. Allstate Insurance Co.' 25 Childs held that a provision in

the uninsured motorist section of an automobile policy, purporting to be an agreement between the company and the insured to
arbitrate the question of liability, was unenforceable. The court
120. Id. § 1, art. IM, § 3(a) (emphasis added).
121. E.g., James, Right to a Jury Trialin CivilActions, 72YAxuaL.J. 655 (1963); Note,
CompulsoryArbitration to Relieve Trial CalendarCongestion, 8 STAN. L. REv. 410 (1956).
See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 432 (1957). In Grace v. Howlett, 51 fll. 2d 478, 283
N.E.2d 474 (1972), the Illinois Supreme Court held the compulsory property damage
arbitration section of that state's no fault law unconstitutional because it violated the

state constitutional right to a jury trial.
122.
123.
124.
Smith v.
125.

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961).
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based its decision not on the constitutional right to a jury trial,
but on the contract law principle that an agreement to arbitrate
the question of liability is not binding. Section I, Article Ill of the
Act does not violate the Childs doctrine because it does not require that insurance policies incorporate a provision to arbitrate;
it merely sets up the apparatus to be utilized should the parties
desire arbitration.
In the event arbitration is chosen by the parties, the Act
provides an extremely broad choice of venue. The party initiating
the action may file his claim with the clerk of court in the county
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, or where the cause
of action arose.'29 In regular civil trials arising out of automobile
accidents, venue is proper only "in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action.'

'2 7

While the relatively broad venue provision of the arbitration
section should, in many cases, be extremely convenient for some
litigants, it will assuredly cause problems. For example, it is unclear whether code section 3-310, which provides for changing the
place of trial "when a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained""' and "when the convenience of the witnesses and the
ends of justice would be promoted"' 29 is applicable to arbitration
hearings. If it is not, conceivably a race to file one's arbitration
claim in a favorable forum could result. If two motorists suffer
property damage in an automobile accident, each may feel that
the other was at fault and thus each would be a potential "plaintiff," desiring to file his claim first in his home county. A related
problem arises out of the section giving the losing party the right
of appeal to the court of common pleas. The Act provides that
when an appeal is requested, it is to be heard by the court of
common pleas for the county where the arbitration hearing has
taken place. As a result, a plaintiff who is successful in filing for
and obtaining an arbitration hearing in his home county effectively precludes the defendant from ever having the case heard
by a court of common pleas that would be more convenient and
at least theoretically more "favorable" to the defendant.
The "claim," which is filed with the clerk of court in lieu of
the traditional formal complaint, sets forth the names of the par126. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. III, § 3(b).
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-303 (1962).

128. Id, § 10-310(2).
129. Id. § 10-310(3).
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ties, the date and place of the accident, and the amount of property damage claimed. 13 The clerk is then to see that a copy of the
claim is served upon the opposing party,'3 1 who has 20 days in
13 2
which to respond.
With regard to the selection of arbitrators, the Act provides
that the court of common pleas or inferior courts of concurrent
jurisdiction shall appoint a panel of three arbitrators, each of
whom shall be members of the bar. 133 Members of the panel are
to be determined "on some fair rotation basis."'3 4 Alternatively,
the parties may agree to have their dispute heard by only one

arbitrator."

5

The court, or the clerk, must assign the arbitrators to hear
the matter within 60 days after the date of filing of the claim. 36
The parties may secure the attendance of witnesses through subpoenas, 13 which are to be enforced by the county court or the
court of common pleas.' The Act provides that the arbitration
hearing shall be liberal in its evidentiary requirements:
Process and procedure shall be as summary and simple as may
130. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. III, § 3(b).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 1, art. I, § 3(c).
133. Id. § 1, art. III, §§ 1,2(a). A potential problem concerning the requirement that
all arbitrators be attorneys has been avoided by an order of the South Carolina Supreme
Court which incorporated a suggestion made by Mr. William A. Dallis, Director, South
Carolina Court Administration. Recognizing that some counties have only a small number
of potential attorney/arbitrators, the court has ordered:
[A] panel of arbitrators for each county shall consist of all attorneys in good
standing, duly admitted to practice law and actively engaged in the practice of
law in the State of South Carolina whose principal offices now or hereafter are
located within the judicial circuit of which such county is a part.
Order of South Carolina Supreme Court, Re: Circuit Court Rule 91, Dec. 31, 1974. This
rule should now make arbitration possbile in counties such as McCormick, which has only
three attorneys, and counties such as Calhoun and Saluda, which similarly have relatively
few practicing lawyers.
Even with this modification, the requirement that all arbitrators be attorneys jeopardizes the arbitration system in that attorneys may not willingly participate in an arbitration session for $35. See note 134 infra. A more realistic scheme could provide one
attorney at a specified rate to insure that one party does not take advantage of the other,
and two arbitrators with claim adjustment experience and expertise in property damage
appraisal at another rate.
134. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. III, § 2(a). Arbitrators are to be compensated in
an amount of up to $35. Id. § 1, art. I, § 2(b).
135. Id. § 1, art. IT, § 2(a).
136. Id. § 1, art. III, § 4(a).
137. Id. § 1, art. I,§ 4(c).
138. Id. § 1, art. III, § 5(a).
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be reasonable, and may provide for the taking of evidence in the
form of reports, statements, itemized bills or in any other manner without the procedural and evidentiary limitations which
pertain in jury trials.'39
A unanimous decision of the arbitrators is not required; two
of the three may determine an issue.' 40 Awardable damages include elements traditionally given in auto property damage litigation: actual damages, loss of use, and depreciation. 14' Furthermore, a significant departure from the original Gasque Commit143
tee proposal4 2 allows punitive damages.
3.

ProceduralProblems of Arbitration

Because of the introduction of a novel system of processing
claims that otherwise"would be handled in a completely judicial
context, several problems arise concerning the interplay of the
new system with traditional tort litigation: the concepts of
splitting causes of action and collateral estoppel.
As early as 1931, in Holcombe v. Garland and Denwiddie,
Inc.,'44 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an injured
motorist who receives both personal injury and property damage
must combine both claims in a single lawsuit; if he successfully
completes an action for property damage, he is precluded from
later suing for personal injuries arising out of the same accident,
and vice versa. According to the court, the reason for such a rule
is that "[the plaintiff] may not harass defendant with a multiplicity of suits by making each element of damage a separate
139. Id. § 1, art. I,§ 1. The Act also provides that depositions may be used in such
arbitration proceedings. Id. The supreme court has ordered that the procedure for such
depositions shall be the same as those set forth in circuit court rule 87 dealing with
depositions in regular civil actions. Order of South Carolina Supreme Court Re: Circuit
Court Rule 91, Dec. 31, 1974. One significant exception, however, is the waiving of the
monetary limitation imposed on deposition proceedings. Rule 87 provides:
This rule shall not apply to those cases where the amount in controversy is less
than the sum of $10,000.00, unless the parties or their counsel agree otherwise,
or unless the Court should so order upon good cause shown.
S.C. CIR. CT.R. 87. The supreme court's order provides that this monetary limitation shall
not be applicable to depositions in connection with arbitration proceedings. Order of
South Carolina Supreme Court Re: Circuit Court Rule 91, Dec. 31, 1974.
140. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. IT,§ 2(a).
141. Id. § 1, art. Ill, § 4(b).
142. S.371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1974) § 1, art. III, § 12.
143. Insurance Reform Act § 1, art. Il, § 1.
144. 162 S.C. 379, 160 S.E. 881 (1931).
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cause of action."4' Unfortunately, adherence to Holcombe would
severely hamper the arbitration system in that only claimants
suffering property damage would be willing to enter arbitration.
Although nothing inthe Act indicates a rejection of the Holcombe
doctrine, it is likely that the drafters of the arbitration section,
had they considered the problem, would have included a provision rejecting the Holcombe concept.
A strict application of the Holcombe'rule would undermine
the position of the person the arbitration section was primarily
designed to protect-the one-car motorist who is without funds
of his own with which to have his car repaired or to purchase a
new car. The Holcombe rule applied to the arbitration context
would place such persons in an unfavorable bargaining position.
It would compel them either to accept immediate arbitration and
recovery of a property damage award (thereby abandoning their
personal injury claims) or to venture through the traditional
judicial route, with its attendant delays and costs. Faced with
this dilemma, the motorist may be forced to settle the property
damage and personal injury claims on what he considers to be
unfavorable terms.
Moreover, since the defendant is not unduly burdened by
being required to defend once in the relatively informal arbitration proceeding and again in a trial on the merits for personal
injury, the above stated rationale for the Holcombe rule is not
applicable. The defendant's objections are somewhat mitigated
by the observation that he could possibly request consolidation
of the de novo hearing by the court of common pleas and trial on
the personal injury claim."'
On the other hand, it could be argued that the arbitration
section was designed primarily for relatively minor accidents involving only property damage and that the Holcombe rule should
remain intact. A plaintiff with both personal injury and property
damage claims can always informally settle the property damage
claim while leaving the personal injury claim for a later trial.
Whatever the intended scope of the arbitration section, it is not
clear that the problem of splitting one's cause of action even
arises in this area. Since a person applying for arbitration is pre145. Id. at 384, 160 S.E. at 883. See also Powers v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 216 S.C.
309, 57 S.E.2d 638 (1950); Flickner v. One Chevrolet Truck & Trailer, 178 S.C. 53, 182
S.E. 104 (1935).
146. Cf. McKinney v. Greenville Ice & Fuel Co., 232 S.C. 257, 101 S.E.2d 659 (1958);
Rush v. Thompson, 203 S.C. 106, 26 S.E.2d 411 (1942).
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cluded from raising his personal injury claim before the arbitration panel-a subject matter jurisdiction limitation-he cannot
be said to have had a chance to raise the second claim and therefore to have voluntarily split his cause of action.
Even if Holcombe is not applicable and separate actions may
in fact be brought for property damage and personal injury, a
further procedural problem arises: the possible application- of the
collateral estoppel doctrine to factual issues underlying the liability determination. In Jones v. Hamm, 4 ' the plaintiff had sued in
federal court, alleging both property damage and personal injury
arising out of an automobile accident. The federal court found for
the plaintiff on the issue of liability and awarded judgment of
$7,500 on the personal injury claim; it made no finding, however,
on the issue of property damage because the ownership of the
automobile was not clear. The plaintiff subsequently brought an
action in the state court on the property damage claim, alleging
that the decision of the federal court was determinative of the
issue of liability. The court granted the defendant's motion to
strike all references to the earlier case from the plaintiff's complaint, thereby implying that the defendant was entitled to a trial
de novo of all issues. On appeal, the supreme court, after noting
that the issue of "splitting a cause of action" was not properly
before it since the issue was not raised in the lower court, reversed
the trial court and held the earlier federal court proceeding binding on the second court. The court said:
It is hornbook law that a prior judgment of a court having
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter is conclusive
in any subsequent action between the same parties, or their
privies, of all questions which were actually litigated in the prior
action and determined by the judgment, regardless of whether
the subsequent action involves the same, or a different cause of
action.'
An example should illustrate the problem: A has both personal injury and property damage claims; B receives only property damage as a result of the accident. Both decide to arbitrate.
A prevails at the arbitration hearing, and B does not appeal.
During a later trial on A's personal injury claim, A attempts to
take advantage of several factual determinations of the
147. 253 S.C. 283, 170 S.E.2d 206 (1969).

148. Id. at 285, 170 S.E.2d at 207.
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arbitration session regarding liability. A strict reading of Hamm
would require that all findings of the three arbitrators, or the one
arbitrator if the parties so choose, be binding on the court trying
the personal injury claim. Again, the Act is silent on the application of collateral estoppel. Arguably, because a de novo review is
provided, the drafters intended little conclusiveness to arbitration determinations of fact. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny all
conclusiveness to an arbitration decision that the parties themselves elect not to appeal.
There are, however, cogent reasons for disallowing a binding
effect. First, the liberal evidentiary and procedural requirements
specified for arbitration suggest an absence of the strong adversarial contest which ordinarily results in a judgment deserving
binding effect. Second, a binding effect seems unwise in light of
the nature of the collateral estoppel doctrine:
Collateral estoppel carries a built-in danger that it may be applied loosely to subsequent litigation having a tenuous connection with the original controversy that application of the doctrine would work an injustice . . . . We would state [this]
limitation. . . : Collateral estoppel by judgment is appropriate
only when it is evident from the pleadings and record that determination of the fact in question was necessary to the final judgment and it was foreseeable that the fact would be of importance in possible future litigation.149
In the arbitration contest, the parties, especially those not represented by counsel, may not foresee at such an early stage the
effect of any factual determination on a later personal injury trial.
Inserting collateral estoppel into the arbitration system may inhibit resort to the arbitration process; if parties know collateral
effect will be given, they may have second thoughts about
arbitrating. On the other hand, they may turn the arbitration
process itself into the very kind of protracted litigation the Act
was designed to obviate.
Fortunately, other jurisdictions faced with similar problems
have developed workable distinctions. In handling prior determinations of small claims courts which have features of informality
of procedure, absence of counsel, and vague evidentiary procedure, several state courts have found that the interests of justice
149. Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Polasky,
CollateralEstoppel-Effect of PriorLitigation, 39 IowA L. Rnv. 217 (1954).
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mandate nonapplication of the res judicata doctrine. 5 ' Also, since
an arbitration session is analogous to a "court of limited jurisdiction," matters incidentally determined should not be given binding effect in subsequent personal injury trials.15' Finally, determinations incidental to utility commission hearings have not been
given binding effect in subsequent related actions. 52
Furthermore, nothing precludes arbitrators from stipulating
that factual determinations are not to be binding on subsequent
personal injury trials. This would seem to be proper in light of the
freely available de novo review. Nor does this procedure encroach
on constitutionally guaranteed jury trials or remedies as the stipulation does not foreclose avenues but merely asserts that arbitration determinations cannot be used beyond the arbitration context.
The arbitration process is quite different from a judicial proceeding and thus should not incorporate many traditional judicial
concepts. But providing an informal method of processing claims
is no guarantee for successful arbitration. The extent to which the
arbitration section of the Act both will be utilized and will
achieve positive results is a matter of speculation at this time. It
is rather doubtful that many motorists will attempt to arbitrate
150. See New Milford Block Co. v. Ericson, 206 A.2d 487 (Conn. Cir. 1964); Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal.2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941).
151. In Weller v. Weller, 14 Ariz. App. 42, 480 P.2d 379 (1971), the court held that a
superior court's determination in a reciprocal support proceeding was not conclusive in a
separate maintenance action with respect to the marital status of the parties:
When a court of limited jurisdiction determines a matter incidental to the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and it would have no jurisdiction to directly determine the matter in an action brought expressly for such determination, the
judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action brought in a court of general
jurisdiction.
Id. at 46, 480 P.2d at 383. Accord Gollner v. Cram, 258 Minn. 8, 102 N.W.2d 521 (1960).
See also Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 977 (1962).
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized similar limitations on the res
judicata effect. See Brother Int'l Corp. v. Southeastern Sales Co., 234 S.C. 573, 109 S.E.2d
444 (1959), citing Dupre v. Gilland, 156 S.C. 109, 152 S.E. 873 (1930):
In any case where the nature of plaintiff's claim is such that defendant's affirmative matter could not properly be pleaded by way of set-off, or the amount of
the set-off is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, the judgment will not preclude
defendant from bringing a separate action.
Id. at 576-77, 109 S.E.2d at 445. Cf. Anderson v. Cave, 49 S.C. 505, 27 S.E. 478 (1897).
152. Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 418 P.2d 265, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673
(1966); Mountain View Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 200, 446 P.2d 424
(1968); Appalachian Power Co. v. John Stewart Walker, Inc., 214 Va. 524, 201 S.E.2d 758
(1974); Lewis Truck Lines, Inc. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wash. 2d 887,
435 P.2d 654 (1967).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss5/3

34

et al.: The South Carolina Insurance Reform Act (Part I): "No Fault" and

1975]

INSURANCE REFORM ACT

without first hiring an attorney,'5 3 despite a proviso in the earlier
version of the Act (later deleted) to the effect that "[tihe parties
may appear before the commission without the necessity of having an attorney to represent them ...
.154 Many attorneys may
desire to avoid arbitration, especially in view of the loose evidentiary requirements that suggest a high degree of unpredictability.
Other features, however, such as the venue provisions, may encourage arbitration. Given a chance to work, the arbitration system established by the Insurance Reform Act may prove a viable
alternative which will help withdraw from overcrowded dockets
the cases that have traditionally been viewed from an attorney's
standpoint as undesirable and economically unrewarding.
III.

ABOLITION OF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE

The common law doctrine of contributory negligence, once
described by Dean Prosser as "a chronic invalid who will not
die,"' 5 is now dead in South Carolina with respect to motor vehicle accidents. A relatively obscure section of the Act, inserted
perhaps to make the entire bill more palatable to the plaintiffs'
bar, provides:
In any motor vehicle accident, contributory negligence shall not
bar recovery in any action by any person or legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury
to person or property, if such contributory negligence was equal
to or less than the negligence which must be established in order
to recover from the party against whom recovery is sought."'
A.

History of the Contributory Negligence Doctrine

The legal doctrine that contributory negligence is a complete
defense to a tort action originated in an 1808 English case,
5 7 and took root
Butterfield v. Forrester,'
in this country as early
as 1824.111 The first South Carolina decision explicitly recognizing
153. At least in cases involving rather extensive property damage, most insurance
companies will probably prefer to have an attorney present when one of their insureds is
a party to an arbitration session. When the party initiating the arbitration claim learns
of this, he will probably also employ counsel on his own behalf.
154. S. 371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1974) § 1, art. III, § 17.
155. W. PRossmn, LAW OF ToRTS § 65, at 418 (4th ed. 1971).
156. Insurance Reform Act § 4C.
157. 11 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
158. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). See also Washburn v. Tracy, 2
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contributory negligence as a defense appears to be Freer v.
Cameron,' 9 an 1851 case wherein the court stated
if a party has been guilty of fault or negligence, not wanton and
intended for mischief, and another, by his own want of ordinary
caution, shall suffer damage thereby, the law will not help to a
recovery. .... "I
The rationale most frequently given for the ascendency of the
contributory negligence doctrine is that early 19th-century infant
industries needed some protection from burdensome litigation
and oversympathetic juries. ' Accordingly, contributory negligence, serving as a complete bar to a tort action, accommodated
unspoken social
"the laissez faire philosophy of the time and the
62
policy of protecting valuable new industries.'

With the appearance of the automobile on the American
scene and the attendant increase in negligence litigation, contributory negligence took on increased importance. Since contributory negligence "to any extent"'63 barred recovery, the doctrine
was often employed by insurance companies and adjusters to
force favorable settlements. Severely injured plaintiffs at times
went uncompensated because a judge or jury found them contributorily negligent in some slight degree.
D. Chip. 128 (Vt. 1824).
159. 4 Rich. 228 (S.C. 1851).
160. Id. at 231. The doctrine quickly caught on in South Carolina. See, e.g., Richardson v. Wilmington & Man. R.R., 8 Rich. 120 (S.C. 1854). Cf. Zemp v. Wilmington & Man.
R.R,., 9 Rich. 84 (S.C. 1855). In 1868, the court stated the rule in more traditional hornbook
fashion:
He who has himself contributed in any degree to the cause of the damage of
which he complains, will not be permitted to recover against another who also
contributed to that cause.
Conlin v. City Council of Charleston, 15 Rich. 201, 209-10 (S.C. 1868).
161. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm.-KEr L. REv. 189, 201

(1950).
This appears to be at least one reason for the growth of the doctrine in South Carolina.
See, e.g., Gunter v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 15 S.C. 443, 450-51 (1881):
This [contributory negligence] is a very important question to the business
interests of the country. There are indeed but few industries which can be
carried on by a single individual, and consequently but few industries that this
question does not touch. Capital and labor, employers and employees, masters
and servants, are all absolutely necessary to progress, and the combination of
these relations reach out and affect every interest of society.
162. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law
Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135, 143 (1958). See also W. PRossER, ComparativeNegligence
in SELECrED Topcs ON THE LAw OF ToRrs 6 (1954); Malone, The FormativeEra of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151 (1946).
163. Gladden v. Southern Ry., 142 S.C. 492, 523, 141 S.E. 90, 100 (1928).
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In time, however, the doctrine lost favor with both courts and
commentators. The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to it as "a discredited doctrine which automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to their
injuries in any degree, however slight," '6 4 and scholars6 5 have
decried the "all or nothing" result that the doctrine engenders.
'
Though contributory negligence was not without its defenders, 66
the overwhelming weight of authority is that the rule, as it exists
at common law, militates too harshly against an injured plaintiff.
B.

ComparativeNegligence
Faced with the rule's severe hampering of recovery and judi-

164. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953).
165. E.g.,,Dean Pound:
It must be recognized that with contributory negligence as a doctrine that even
the slightest want of due care on the part of a plaintiff will bar recovery for even
the most serious injury through the negligence of another is fundamentally and
radically unjust and ought to be given up.
Pound, ComparativeNegligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 195, 197 (1954); Dean Prosser:
The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the obvious
injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties
on one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff, least able to bear it,
and quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scott free
[sic]. No one ever has succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever
will.
W. PROSSER, supra note 162, at 7; Professor James: "[Clontributory negligence [is]
concededly one of the weak spots in a system of liability based on fault." James,
ContributoryNegligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 735 (1953); Professor Green:
The exactions of the appellate courts in the matter of contributory negligence
are only one instance of the techniques employed by appellate courts for formalizing justice . . . .[L]itigation is circumscribed and denied the freedom and
finality of the processes which the common law has so laboriously developed.
Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. Rzv. 116, 129 (1944).
166. One writer even went so far as to refer to it as "the last bar . . . to complete
chaos in our courts." Benson, ComparativeNegligence-Boon or Bane, 23 INs. CoUNs. J.
204, 214 (1956). See also McKiron, The CaseAgainst Comparative Negligence, 28 J.S.B.
CALIF. 23 (1953). Judicial and academic defenders of the contributory negligence defense
have attempted to justify the doctrine on one or more of the following rationalizations:
(1) that a negligent plaintiff, in effect, gives implied consent to all the consequences of his negligent act;
(2) that where two parties are at fault, the courts should leave the parties as
they are in the spirit of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands;
(3) that contributory negligence provides a necessary check on plaintifforiented juries;
(4) that the plaintiff's negligence is a superseding and intervening cause which
acts as a cleavage between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury;
and
(5) that the doctrine somehow restrains carelessness.
Haugh, ComparativeNegligence:A Reform Long Overdue, 49 ORn. L. Rzv. 38, 39 (1969).
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cial indifference or inertia preventing significant change, the legislatures of many states responded with statutes generically
termed "comparative negligence" legislation. Although Mississippi first passed such a statute in 1910,167 the movement towards
comparative negligence made little headway until the late 1960's.
An upsurge in legislation, enacted to a large extent by those states
adopting no fault, brought the number of states embracing comparative negligence to 26.165 Basically, comparative negligence
involves the abolition of contributory negligence as a defense and
the substitution of a principle allowing the plaintiff to recover an
award reduced in a proportion equal to his own negligence. 6 '
Thus, the United States, which only eight years ago was
170
referred to as "the last stronghold of contributory negligence,'
167. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
163. See, e.g., Amt. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14
(Supp. 1971); Conn. Unclassified 1973 Public Acts, P.A. 73-627 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. §
105-603 (1968); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Cum. Supp. 1971); IAHO CODE § 6-801 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, § 85 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Cum.Supp. 1974); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. 25-1151 (1970); NEV.Rav. STAT. § 41-141
(1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (Cum.Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-4 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (Cum.Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
9 (Cum.Supp. 1974); Oregon Laws 1971, ch. 668, § 1; R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 9-20-4 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); S.D. CoMPL.ED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 209-2 (1967); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Cum.Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-27-37 (Cum.Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Cum.Supp. 1972); WASH. Ray.
CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Cum.Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-7.2 (Cum,Supp. 1973). Additionally, Florida has recently adopted comparative
negligence judicially. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
169. For example, a plaintiff found to be 30 percent contributorily negligent would
be able to sue and recover damages, but would have his recovery reduced by 30 percent
to account for his own negligence. According to Prosser, the designation of these statutes
as "comparative negligence" legislation is incorrect:
Comparative negligence properly refers only to a comparison of the fault of the
plaintiff with that of the defendant. It does not necessarily result in any division
of the damages, but may permit full recovery by the plaintiff notwithstanding
his contributory negligence. Traditionally. . .it has been associated with the
idea of degrees of negligence, and a comparison of "slight," "ordinary," and
"gross." In the interest of clarity the term should be avoided, and the statutes
here in question should be called "damage apportionment" or "comparative
damage" acts. . . . "Comparative negligence" is, however, in much too general
use to permit hope of its elimination.
W. PnossER, supra note 162, at 1. See also Schwartz, The Impact of Comparative
Negligence, 23 DEF. L.J. 223, 226 (1974). In the intervening years since Prosser offered this
explanation, the term "comparative negligence" has become even more firmly entrenched
as referring to the "damage apportionment" type statutes. Accordingly, when used in this
note, the term "comparative negligence" refers to these statutes requiring a diminution
of damages on the part of the plaintiff.
170. Maki v. Frelk, 85 ll. App. 2d 439, 448, 229 N.E.2d 284, 289 (1967).
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has now moved to a position in which a majority of the states have
accepted the more enlightened doctrine. Earlier, contributory
negligence had been abandoned in England, the country of its
origin,'71 in favor of a comparative negligence system. Moreover,
nearly all of continental Europe, all of Canada, New Zealand, and
Western Australia have for years operated under some form of
damage apportionment statute. 72
C.

Comparison With the South CarolinaStatute

The prototype state statute for comparative negligence is
that of Wisconsin, first enacted in 1931 and widely emulated by
other states. It provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if
such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering."'
This statute differs from section 4C of the South Carolina Act in
two major respects: scope of application and apportionment of
damages.
1. Scope of Section 4C
The South Carolina Act applies only to negligence cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, whereas all other states' statutes are much broader in scope. For example, the statutes of
Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming 74 specifically apply whenever the plaintiff seeks "to
171. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, ch. 28.
172. See W. PRoSSMa, supra note 162, at 3-4. In addition, several federal statutes
employ damage apportionment. E.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53
(1970); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 76168 (1970).
173. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958).
174. Coro. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971); HAWAI RV. STAT. § 663-31 (Cum.
Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MinN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.01 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Cur. Supp. 1973); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:9-4 (Cum. Supp. 1973); OxxA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Oregon Laws 1971, ch. 668, § 1; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Cum. Supp. 1974);
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recover damages for negligence." The South Dakota, Connecticut, and Nebraska statutes cover harms "caused by" or "based
on" negligence."' Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Nevada have
perhaps the broadest statutes of all, embracing "all actions for
personal injuries."' 75
It is unfortunate that the South Carolina provision is so narrowly drawn. The unfairness that is caused by the application of

the contributory negligence defense obtains in all negligence
cased, not just in those involving motor vehicle accidents. Perhaps this section of the Act is so worded to avoid potential constitutional challenges. Article III, section 17 of the South Carolina
Constitution provides: "Every act or resolution having the force
of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed
in the title."'77 This constitutional provision, requiring both that
the title of a bill fully and accurately state its contents and that
every part of the bill be germane to its general subject matter, has
as its purpose prevention of "surprise or deception of the people
at the hands of the legislature and, likewise.
17
legislature at the hands of itself.'

. .

deception of the

Since the lengthy title to the Insurance Reform Act lists, as
one of its purposes, "To Provide For Recovery for Injury Arising
Out Of A Motor Vehicle Accident Whether Negligence of the
Plaintiff Partially Contributes to the Injury," there should be no
valid argument that the title to the Act does not fully apprise the
reader that a contributory negligence provision is contained
therein. 7 A more serious objection might possibly be raised with
VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 12, § 1036 (Cum. Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
175. S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); Conn. Unclassified 1973 Public Acts,
P.A. 73-627 (1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1151 (1970).
176. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); R.I. GEM. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Cum. Supp.
1973); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41-141 (1971).
177. S.C. CONsr. art. 3, § 17.
178, Comment, South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code-The Demise of Its
Long-Arm Provision, 24 S.C.L. REv. 474, 480 (1972).
179. Thus, there is little possibility that this section of the Act will exhibit the same
weaknesses that nullified the state's long arm statute, which was originally enacted as part
of the South Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-

801 to -809 (Supp. 1966). After several federal cases indicated that the long arm provision
was unconstitutional because the title of the act adopting the Uniform Commercial Code
in South Carolina did not clearly designate that a jurisdictional provision was included
in the supposedly commercial statute, McGee v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co., 337 F.
Supp. 72 (D.S.C. 1972); Tention v. Southern Pac. R.R., 336 F. Supp. 25 (D.S.C. 1972),
the legislature simply reenacted the long arm provision as a separate statute. No. 13143,
[1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2518.
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respect to the second prong of the constitutional requirement,
namely, that the contributory negligence provision, which alters
a longstanding doctrine of tort law, is improperly included in
what purports to be essentially an insurance act. Thus, perhaps
one reason the contributory negligence provision of the South
Carolina Act is so narrow in its application is that its drafters
were attempting to meet potential constitutional challenges by
restricting its coverage to an area that is within the scope of the
Act.
Whatever the reason for the present wording, the contributory negligence provision of the statute does meet the requirements of the South Carolina Constitution.' Even though the Act
is referred to as an "insurance reform act," it is actually much
broader than a simple insurance statute in that it deals with
many problems associated with automobile accident reparations.
Arguably, the contributory negligence provision is an integral
,component of the general statutory scheme of the Act, which is
to provide prompt, definite recovery by a person injured in an
automobile accident. Heretofore, settlement negotiations often
have been severely hampered by the troublesome factual issue of
contributory negligence. With this element eliminated, claims
adjustment should proceed more smoothly and produce more realistic results. 8'
2. Apportionment of Damages
Certainly the most striking feature of he contributory negligence section, if not the entire Act, is its lack of an apportionment
of damages clause.8 2 Whether such an outcome was intended or
180. Adding to the probable success in meeting the constitutional hurdle of article
II, § 17 is the fact that most cases interpreting this provision indicate that it is to be
"liberally construed," e.g., Chesterfield County v. State Highway Dep't, 191 S.C. 19, 3
S.E.2d 686 (1939); Southern Power Co. v. Walker, 89 S.C. 84, 71 S.E. 356 (1911), and that
"several branches of one general subject [may be dealt with] in a single Act." McCollum
v. Snipes, 213 S.C. 254, 262, 49 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1948); DeLoach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21,
29, 198 S.E. 409, 412 (1938).
181. "[Ihf defendants were deprived of the hope of avoiding recovery through the
application of the contributory negligence rule, there would be a tendency to settle these
cases, thus decreasing the percentage of cases tried." Maloney, supra note 162, at 163.
182. E.g., "[B]ut any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045
(1958); "[B]ut the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent
as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damages." ME. R.v. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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was due to mere legislative oversight is pure speculation. Nevertheless, the South Carolina statute, as written, simply provides
that a litigant whose negligence was equal to or less than that of
his opponent may sue and recover his full measure of damages.
refer to South Carolina's adopting
Thus, those articles which
"comparative negligence" ' are incorrect, if the term comparative negligence is used in the. generally accepted sense. 84
It is this aspect of-the South Carolina provision which is the
most uniqie. The statutes of all but one of the other 25 states
specifically incorpowhich have adopted comparative negligence
1 5
rate an apportionment of damages clause.

Thus it is obvious that the legislature has eliminated one
hardship only to create another, inasmuch as the South Carolina
arrangement merely shifts the entire loss from the.plaintiff to the
defendant, when both are at fault, instead of seeking some sort
of equitable allocation of the damages between the parties according to their relative degrees of carelessness.
Inequitable as it may be, an historical basis actually exists
for the South Carolina version of comparative negligence. As
early as 1794, the Prussian Code'88 allowed full recovery by a
partially negligent plaintiff. Furthermore, two American states at
one time followed this scheme of comparing negligence for the
purpose of determining the entire liability. In Galena & Chicago
Union R.R. v. Jacobs,'7 the Illinois Supreme Court moved to a
system whereby the negligence of the two parties was compared:
if the fault of the plaintiff was "slight," and that of the defendant
"gross" by comparison, then the plaintiff was allowed full recovery of his damages. Kansas adopted a similar scheme by judicial
183. E.g., S.C. DEP'T OF INsURANCE, BuLL. No. 17-74, FIRST brERRsnTVa BULLrM ON

S-371, at 41 (July 12, 1974); S.C. TRIAL LAwYERS ASs'N, NEws BuLL., at 21 (July, 1974).
184. See note 169 supra.
185. See note 168 supra. The one state whose statute does not provide for an apportionment of damages, Georgia, had already judicially adopted comparative negligence,
including the apportionment of damages aspect, when the statute was enacted. GA. ConE
ANN. § 105-603 (1968). The concept was first suggested in Georgia in Macon & Western
R.R. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250 (1858). The next year, the Georgia court expressly adopted the
doctrine: "[W]e hold to be sound law . . . ftlhat where both parties are in fault, but
the defendant most so, the fault of the plaintiff may go in mitigation of damages."
Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358, 362 (1859). For an excellent discussion of the Georgia
developments, see Turk, supra note 161, at 326-33. See also Hilkey, ComparativeNegligence in Georgia, 8 GA. B.J. 51 (1945).
186. Allgenerines Landrecht fuer die PreussischenStaten (1794).
187. 20 Ill.
478 (1858).
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fiat in 1872.1s8 The doctrine was relatively short-lived in both
states.189 Although some writers have suggested that the punitive
result of the absence of an apportionment of damages arrangement caused its demise, ' most agree that the difficulty in
applying the "slight-gross" dichotomy was the overriding reason
for its disappearance."'
Regardless of the true reason for the burial of this doctrine
in Illinois and Kansas, its corpse has now been unearthed by the
South Carolina legislature. It should be pointed out, however,
that some beneficial features wilt obtain from the Act as written.
Many injured plaintiffs will not be subjected to the unfairness of
the old rule. Moreover, there will be a sharp increase in the number of settlements before trial, because insurance companies will
no longer be able to hold out for a finding of contributory negligence. A concomitant disadvantage, however, will be the effect on
insurance premiums. Though there is genuine disagreement over
whether a traditional comparative negligence statute has an appreciable effect on insurance premiums,'92 there can be little
doubt that the South Carolina version will inflate premium rates.
Because there will be many more payouts by insurance companies, without any offsetting of the damages recoverable by a
plaintiff, it would appear that section 4C is contrary to one of the
announced purposes of the Act-lower premiums for South Carolina drivers.
The possibility also exists that true comparative negligence
and apportionment of damages will be read into the Act by judicial decision, but this course appears to be unlikely. Without any
188. Pacific R.R. v. Houts, 12 Kan. 259 (1873); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 351 (1872).

189. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Hessions, 150 11. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894); Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77, 1 P. 298 (1883).
190. Turk, supra note 161, at 308.
191. Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 51 (1944).
192. See, e.g., Benson, Comparative Negligence-Boon or Bane, 23 INs. CoUNs. J.

204, 214 (1956) ("[T]here is general agreement .

.

. that comparative negligence in-

creases the number of cases sued and also increases insurance premiums."); W. PRosseR,
supra note 162, at 60-61:
[Wisconsin lawyers report] that the increase in the number of recoveries which
must inevitably result from the abrogation of the complete defense has been to
a considerable extent balanced and compensated by some reduction in the size
of verdicts, as juries apportion the damages instead of refusing to find contributory negligence at all. . ..
See also Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L.
Rev. 689 (1960).
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9 3 or any recorded legislative history in
applicable precedent"
South Carolina, it is most likely that a court would refuse to read
an apportionment of damages clause into the statute. Otherwise
the effect of the statute as written would be radically altered, an
unusual step for a South Carolina court to take when the legislature could have easily worded its statute as have other states had

it chosen to do so.
3.

Miscellaneous Problems

a. Equal Negligence

Section 4Q provides that a litigant is not barred from recovery if his negligence is "equal to or less than" the negligence of
the other party. Thus, it is conceivable that a jury might find the
parties equally negligent and direct that each be compensated for

his damages. In.such cases, it is uncertain whether each will
recover from the other, party his full damages, or whether there
will be a setoff, with the party incurring the most damages re-

covering the difference between his damages and those of his
opponent. Any setoff approach would be incorrect in view of both
the language of the statute and the wording of the standard liability insurance policy that the company agrees to pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which the insured "shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages." '94
b.

Assumption of the Risk
Many states that have moved to comparative negligence

193. Since all states that have adopted comparative negligence by statute have specifically included an apportionment of damages clause, see note 185 supra and accompanying text, there is absolutely no precedent for judicial insertion of such a clause into a
comparative negligence scheme.
194. The problem is better understood if a simple example is used. Suppose A and B
are involved in an intersectional collision and both receive severe injuries. The jury determines that the negligence of each driver contributed equally to the accident. A's medical
expenses and lost wages amount to $41,000, but B's total only $40,000. If a setoff approach
is followed, A will be entitled to recover but $1,000 from B, and B will recover nothing
from A. Even assuming both drivers carried the maximum first party coverage of $5,000,
neither can be said to be "compensated" for his accident. The inequity becomes apparent
when it is realized that each has paid liability insurance premiums which, supposedly,
covered liability to third parties. For an argument that cases holding the offsetting of
damages recoverable are improper and against the interests of both litigants who have
paid premiums to cover their liability, see Leflar & Wolfe, Panel on ComparativeNegligence and Liability Insurance, Must the Insurer Reimburse the Insured for His Personal
Loss CreditedAgainst the Judgment?, 11 ARK. L. Rsv. 71, 77 (1956).
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have encountered the problem of determining how the common
law doctrine of assumption of the risk fits into the statutory
scheme. Assumption of the risk is the express or implied acceptance of a known danger,'95 while contributory negligence is the
plaintiff's lack of due care; both have traditionally been a complete defense. If a comparative nqgligence statute eliminates contributory negligence as a defense, how viable is the doctrine of
assumption of the risk, which causes an equally harsh result?
Some states, such as Oregon, 9 ' have avoided all confusion in this
area by specifically incorporating assumption of the risk into.
their comparative negligence statutes. In jurisdictions where the
statute makes no reference to assumption of the risk, there is a
split of authority. Minnesota, for example, has held that assumption of the risk remains as a complete bar to an action in the face
of a comparative negligence statute;'97 Wisconsin, on the other
hand, has treated hssumption of the risk in the same manner as
contributory negligence, a factor in mitigation of damages only."'
When the Federal Employers' Liability Act was first enacted, it
said nothing about assumption of the risk, and the United States
Supreme Court held that the defense remained available to a
litigant. 9 In 1939, that act was reworded to eliminate assumption
of the risk entirely.2"' Since the South Carolina statute is silent
on assumption of the risk, and since South Carolina has recognized, as some other states have, that theie are two distinct but
overlapping doctrines,0 1 there is a good possibility that assump2 2
tion of the risk is still viable. 1

195. Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 205 S.C. 333, 32 S.E.2d 5 (1944). See also Bagh
v. Webb, 231 Ark. 27, 328 S.W.2d 379 (1959).
196. Oregon Laws, 1971, ch. 668, § 1. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85
(Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
197. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
198. McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14
(1962).
199. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914).
200. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
201. Cases cited note 195 supra.
202. The South Carolina legislature recognized that there is a distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk in the strict liability area. Legislative
adoption of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is express approval of the use of
assumption of risk as a complete defense to a strict liability claim. See No. 1184 [1974]
S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2782, § 2. But by incorporating the comments to § 402A, which are

critical of the doctrine of contributory negligence, as "legislative intent," the legislature
at least impliedily negated application of the contributory negligence doctrine in the strict
liability context. Id. § 3.
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c. Retroactivity
Another difficulty encountered in states enacting comparative negligence statutes is determihing the exact date that the
statute becomes effective. The statutes of eight states specifically
apply to claims accruing after a certain date." 3 In other states,
the question of retroactivity has been a problem.2 4
Arguably, the South Carolina provision is clear regarding the
effective date since the last section of the Act"' provides that,
with certain exceptions (the no fault provisions and the reinsurance facility), the entire Act took effect "upon approval by the
Governor," thus, on July 9, 1974. The wording does, however,
appear somewhat vague insofar as it does not explicitly state
whether the Act applies to causes of action that accrue on or after
July 9, 1974, or to trials that began on or after that date. Again,
the absence of any definite legislative intent makes this an open
question. In view 'ofthe radical changes introduced by the Act it
is probable that a court would hold the new approach applicable
only to litigation involving automobile accidents occurring on or
after the effective date of the Act.
d. Multiple Parties
One final problem that has arisen in other jurisdictions and
that will undoubtedly cause much litigation in South Carolina
concerns multiparty negligence actions. For example, suppose
drivers A, B and C are involved in an auto accident, and the jury
determines the relative degrees of fault involved thusly: A-40%,
B-35% and C-25%. Since B's negligence is less than A's but more
than C's, should B be allowed to recover from A, but not from C?
Should C, in turn, be allowed to recover from either A or B? Could
A successfully argue that even though his negligence is greater
than that of either B or C individually, the collective negligence
of B and C exceeds his, and that therefore it would be inequitable
to require him to compbnsate either or both of them? These are
but a few of the problems that have arisen in other jurisdictions
recognizing comparative negligence.00
203. Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Texas and Vermont.
204. Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1438 (1971).
205. Insurance Reform Act § 15.
206. W. PossER, supra note 162, at 61; Laugesen, Colorado ComparativeNegligence,
48 DEN. L.J. 469 (1972); Maloney, supra note 162, at 11. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d
722 (1966).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen from this overview of the first party coverage,
arbitration, and "comparative negligence" provisions of the
South Carolina Insurance Reform Act, the South Carolina General Assembly has made a sincere-effort to alleviate some of the
problems indigenous to the current system of automobile accident reparations. With respect to the first party coverage or socalled "no fault" provisions of the Act, the legislature drew heavily from existing plans in other states. South Carolina's plan,
however, is not as far reaching as most acts in other states and
has been amended and compromised so extensively that it contains inevitable interpretive difficulties as a consequence. Considerable litigation can be expected over:;some of the uncertain
passages, such as the amount of the setoff. Nevertheless, the plan
should be given a chance to work, since nearly any change would
be some improvement in the troublesome area of automobile negligence actions.
The property damage arbitration provision is an extremely
well-drafted and desirable piece of legislation. Unparalleled in
any existing no fault plan, it represents a novel solution to the
problems engendered by these court-congesting controversies.
The only ingredient needed to make ihe arbitration system work
is the willingness of attorneys to utilize it.
Unfortunately, the adroit legislative draftsmanship in the no
fault and arbitration provisions of this South Carolina Act is
noticeably absent from the treatment of contributory negligence.
The section of the Act which purports to adopt "comparative
negligence" for South Carolina is perhaps the most inartfully
drafted section of the entire statute, and most probably it will
cause vast amounts of litigation. As presently worded, that section demonstrate&the truth of Dean Prosser's statement:
All of these [comparative negligencestatutes] are obviously
the result of conflicting interests in the legislatures, and smack
of political expedieney rather that any reason or logic in the
situation. 0
207. W. PRossER, supra note 155, § 67, at 437. See also Schwartz, supra note 169, at
233, wherein the author, after reviewing the various comparative negligence statutes,
concludes:
[W]hen comparative negligence is implemented by statute, the legislature
should spend ample time both in selecting the basic system and in resolving the
various collateral legal problems. It is somewhat surprising to learn how little
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In view of the amplitude of collateral legal problems contained in the present wording of the South Carolina contributory
negligence provision, the legislature should take definite steps to
reformulate its original intent. Ideally, remedial legislation of this
kind would emerge as a separate comparative negligence statute,
so that state constitutional problems may be avoided. The statute should apply to all tort actions and include an apportionment
of damages clause. In addition, the legislature should eliminate
the problem which arises when both parties are found to be
equally negligent anid should incorporate a definite statement on
retroactivity. Moreover, if corrective action is not forthcoming,
litigants in South Carolina inay find that section 4C has eliminated one area of the law which produced numerous inequities
and thorny factual issues only to breed new problems of a legal
nature concerning the correct interpretation of the statute.
use legislatures have made of this latter opportunity; generally, they have enacted broadly phrased statutes, leaving it to the judiciary to solve collateral
problems on a case by case basis.
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